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The aim of this work is to address the critical issues regarding the retail electricity market
in Italy. Since 2007, residential consumers have been able to freely choose their energy
provider. However, as the national energy regulator pointed out, retail market is still
suffering from paucity of competitive dynamics and insufficient consumer participation
in the free market. One of the reasons that may have contributed to consumer inertia is
the coexistence of the free market with the regulated branch. Although competitive prices
appear to be on average lower than regulated ones, consumers seem reluctant to switch to
the free market. A few studies examine the determinants influencing consumer engagement
in the energy sector and they show that consumer inertia is due to both monetary and
behavioural reasons. In this work, using ARERA’s public databases, we empirically
analyse how the market structure, in terms of number of distinct local incumbents, and the
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Introduction
Residential consumers have been able to freely choose their energy provider since 2007.
However, Decree Law № 162/20191 has further delayed2 the completion of the retail
electricity market liberalisation in Italy. To date, it represents the latest legislative
intervention regarding the creation and fulfilment of a competitive internal market for
electricity, which has been advocated by the European Union since 1996.3 The deferment
turned out to be inevitable when ARERA4 – the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy,
Networks and the Environment – highlighted critical issues regarding the paucity of
competitive dynamics and the inadequacy of residential consumers’ participation in the
free market – accounting, on average, for 46.5% of total Points of Delivery (PODs) in year
2019.5 Accordingly, the authority pointed out to both the Parliament and the Government
the need to extend the coexistence of the regulated retail market,6 known as Servizio di
Maggior Tutela (henceforth, SMT), i.e., greater protection service. Until 1st January,
2022, residential customers will be granted two options:
• maintaining their contracts with the incumbent entitled to provide the retail service
in their area, under a regulated framework where prices are quarterly defined by
ARERA; or
1Converted into Law№ 8/2020 on 28th February, 2020.
2Originally, Competition Law № 124/2017 established the end of regulated prices on 1st July, 2019.
Decree Law№ 91/2018 at first postponed it to 1st July, 2020; then, Decree Law№ 162/2019 again postponed
it to 1st January, 2022 for domestic customers & small businesses and to 1st January, 2021 for eligible SMEs,
distinguished from small businesses on the basis of revenues, number of employees and power supplied.
3See: Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19th December, 1996
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, which established ‘common rules for the
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity [...] whereas, in the internal market, electricity
undertakings must be able to operate with a view to achieving a competitive market in electricity.’
4Autorità di Regolazione per Energia, Reti e Ambiente.
5Source: ARERA, Notice№ 515/2019/I/com.
6Source: ARERA, Notice№ 23/2020/I/com.
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• switching to the free market, where they are given the possibility to choose their
contracts among those offered by a multiplicity of competitive firms.
Given the low differentiable nature of the services provided and considering that
retailers operate in a minutely regulated sector,7 where the observance of quality standards
is thoroughly supervised, it is reasonable to consider the services supplied as homogeneous
(Joskow & Tirole, 2006). As a consequence, consumer choice should be oriented to the
cheapest tariff.
Regardless of the wide range of tariffs made available by a multiplicity of firms and
in spite of the fact that cheaper prices can be found in the free market (Magnani, Manenti
& Valbonesi, 2020), consumers still seem reluctant to abandon regulated prices. Even
considering the free market branch only, competitive dynamics appear inhibited, resulting
in high market concentration.8
Several studies analyse the determinants influencing consumer engagement in energy
markets and it has been shown that consumer inertia is due to both monetary and
behavioural reasons. Low perceived economic benefits, brand loyalty, mistrust versus
new entrants, search and learning costs are few of them.
To some extent, the structure of the Italian retail market, whose regulated service is
provided in most of the territory by one big firm, may have contributed to the exacerbation
of this phenomenon in the first place. In such an environment, consumers may lose
incentive to search for other trustworthy competitors and end up ‘sticking’ to the incumbent.
This is especially evident if we consider that, while consumers decide to exit the regulated
market, the vast majority subscribes a contract with free market suppliers belonging to
the same group as the SMT.9
7See: ARERA, Resolution № 413/2016/R/com, Testo integrato della regolazione della qualità dei
servizi di vendita di energia elettrica e di gas naturale (TIQV), i.e., Uniform Code Governing the Quality
of Electricity and Gas Sales Services.
8In year 2008, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) with respect to the free market branch only was
reported to be above 2500, which is associated with highly concentrated industries. Source: ARERA, 2019b.
9About 60% of SMT exits is directed towards firms owned by the same group as the SMT firm
supplier. Source: ARERA, 2019b.
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The aim of this thesis is to address these critical issues. The work is organised as follows:
in the first chapter, we briefly describe the history of the Italian electricity sector and
provide an overview of the current framework, focusing on the structure of the supply; in
the second chapter, we introduce the problem of consumer inertia, reviewing the literature
that we believe to be pertinent to our analysis and we discuss the level of consumer
engagement and market concentration in the Italian retail electricity market; eventually,
in the third chapter, by means of ARERA public databases, we empirically analyse how
the market structure, in terms of number of distinct local incumbents, and the presence of
a national incumbent, might have affected switching rates and the participation in the free




The Italian Retail Electricity Market
EU Member States have been progressively reshaping the utility sector for the last thirty
years. Such a liberalisation process, coherently with the objective of reducing barriers
to intra-EU service provision in favour of a European Single Market, also involved the
energy industry. The European Parliament and the Council have been promoting an
Internal Electricity Market since 1996. Directive 96/92/EC aimed at enhancing the
provision of electricity by allowing competition and by defining common harmonised
rules across the EU countries. Italy transposed the 1996 EU Directive into the ‘Bersani
Decree’,1 which established the unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution
and retail sale. Those activities, which were once the prerogative of a monopolistic,
vertically-integrated, company, underwent a deep rearrangement leading to competitive
fragmentation. Initially, the liberalisation of retail markets encompassed large consumers
only, consistently with the provisions of the EU Directive. In 2007, with Decree Law
№ 73/20072, the liberalisation of the electricity retail became effective for domestic
customers and small/medium-sized enterprises, too. Since then, residential customers
have been able to freely choose their energy supplier subscribe a contract in the free
market. Nevertheless, the liberalisation process was designed to be gradual: alongside the
free market, a regulated branch (Servizio di Maggior Tutela) has been serving customers.
The rationale of a progressive phase-out lied in the necessity to guide consumers through
a more conscious and aware transition to the free market, in compliance with the EU
1Legislative Decree№ 79/1999.
2Converted into Law№ 125/2007.
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Directives and Competition Law№ 124/2017.3
In the first part of this chapter, we briefly look at the history of the Italian electricity
sector, focusing in particular on the transition from a fragmented regional system to
an integrated public monopoly and on the recent transformations implemented by the
liberalisation process. Finally, with the aid of thematic maps, we depict the presence of
free and regulated market retailers in Italy, highlighting how the historical positioning of
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) across the Italian territory affected the current
allocation of local incumbents entitled to provide Servizio di Maggior Tutela.
1.1 Historical Framework
1.1.1 From the Regional System to the State-Owned Monopoly
In Italy, prior to the nationalisation of the sector, electricity was produced and distributed
by small and medium firms, scattered throughout the territory, connected and controlled
by a few larger companies and consortia.4 After World War II, on the wave of economic
expansion, the debate regarding the nationalisation of the electricity sector –aimed at
encouraging massive interventions for industrialisation– became fervent. The main
objective was to produce greater conditions for the coordination of regional networks at
the national level. However, the fragmentation of the sector hindered the progress of the
project. On one hand, public firms merged in Finelettrica –subsidiary of IRI, i.e. Istituto
per la Ricostruzione Industriale, a public holding company– and strived to strengthen
energy production and transport at the national level; on the other hand, most of the private
firms had no incentive to alter their regional model (Castronovo, 1994).
In 1962, in order to overcome the national coordination obstacles and to favour
the optimal exploitation of resources, ENEL (Ente Nazionale per l’energia Elettrica,
i.e. National Entity for Electricity) was finally established. Law № 1643/19625 led to
the unification of the national electricity system: under this arrangement, the whole
3Source: ARERA Document№ 397/2019/R/EEL.
4E.g.: Edison, SADE, SIP, Centrale, SME, UNES, CEdiS.
5Proposed by Fanfani Cabinet IV and approved on 26th June, 1962.
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production chain was responsibility of one single institution. ENEL was entrusted with the
activities of production, import/export, transport, transformation, distribution and sale of
electricity. Thus began the ENEL monopoly, lasted thirty years, during which the public
electricity service was provided by a single, large, vertically integrated, State-owned
company. In the last decade of the century, however, an extensive process of privatisation
and liberalisation of the sector was undertaken.
1.1.2 The liberalisation Process
EU’s Internal Electricity Market Pillars
As far as 1988, European Commission emphasised the need to achieve a higher degree
of integration in the energy sector, whereas barriers to trade within the Community
were jeopardising the creation of a common market.6 The new European Community
standards, which included the privatisation of utility services and the transition from
public ownership to public regulation, propelled the liberalisation process. With the
1992 Maastricht Treaty, the European Community defined the implementation of energy
measures as one of its objectives. In the following years, the EU launched three Directives
in order to promote the regulation and liberalisation of the internal market.
Directive№ 96/92/EC defines harmonised rules for the internal electricity market.
More specifically, it deals with the phases of electricity production chain, from generation
to distribution, with the main aim of encouraging the gradual abandonment of the
monopolistic regime and promoting, to some degree, an adequate level of competition.
Concerning the production phase, Member States are allowed to choose between an
authorization procedure or a tendering procedure for the construction of new generating
capacities. Regarding the phase of electricity transmission and distribution, Transmission
System Operators (TSOs) and Distribution System Operators (DSOs) must behave ‘in an
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner’ and, to this aim, the structural
separation regime for vertically integrated firms is introduced: the management of
transmission or distribution activities must be independent from other activities and
6Commission of the European Communities. Directorate-General for Energy. (1988). Energy in Europe:
The Internal Energy Market. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
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operators must not discriminate between system users, particularly if this happens to be in
favour of their subsidiaries. Finally, in order to ensure the attainment of these measures,
integrated electricity undertakings must adopt the principle of accounting separation.
Directive№ 2003/54/EC, repealing the previous one, establishes new criteria for the
designation of TSOs and DSOs and it allows new suppliers to access the market. All
consumers are given the opportunity to choose (from mid-2007) their own supplier on the
free market. Nonetheless, it is stated that the completion of the liberalised market must
follow a phased approach to enable industry adjustments and to protect the interests of
customers and the effectiveness of their choices.
Directive№ 2009/72/EC, repealing the previous one, reduces disparities with the aim
of reaching a level playing field. It establishes transparency standards for the protection
of consumers and corrective measures in order to prevent vertically integrated firms from
adopting strategies that hinder competitiveness. Moreover, together with Regulation№
713/2009, promotes the birth of an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
(ACER).
The Implementation of EU Directives
In 1992, thirty-seven years after its creation, ENEL was transformed into a joint-stock
company: it was the end of the State-owned monopoly.7 Few years later, ‘Bersani Decree’8,
in compliance with the 1996 EU Directive, formally paved the way to the liberalisation
process in Italy.
However, only in 2007, with Decree Law № 739, residential consumers and SMEs
were involved in this process. Starting from 1st July, 2007, all residential customers
can freely choose their electricity supplier or, alternatively, as a default setting, they are
supplied within the regulated regime, the SMT, whose tariffs are set by ARERA10. After
7In compliance with the ‘unbundling and transparency of accounts’ provisions, included in the EU
Directives, it will be subsequently subject to a corporate reorganization which transformed it to a holding
company controlling over three subsidiaries: Enel Produzione, Terna and Enel Distribuzione, respectively
entrusted with production, transmission, distribution & selling activities.
8Legislative Decree№ 79/1999.
9Converted by Law№ 125/07.
10Formerly called AEEG, Autorità per l’energia elettrica il gas (until 22th December, 2011) and AEEGSI,
Autorità per l’energia elettrica il gas ed il sistema idrico (until 27th December, 2017).
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being at the attention of the political debate for few years, the deadline for the SMT was
set by Competition Law№ 124/2017 on 1st July, 2019. Nonetheless, on 25th July, 2018,
the Government, considering that at that time less than 45% of total residential consumers
were participating in the free market, decided to extend the SMT’s functioning by one year.
For similar reasons, at the end of 2019, Decree Law № 162/2019 established a further
prorogation of the SMT until 1st January, 2022 for domestic customers. Eligible SMEs
can avail themselves of SMT only until 1st January, 2021, in compliance with the latest
EU Directive.11
1.2 Current Retail Market Structure
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, since 2007, liberalisation has encompassed
residential consumers, too. However, the choice of a provider in the free market was not
compulsory. According to the progressiveness upon which the liberalisation process was
based, a hybrid market was created. Customers who have not yet exercised a choice, can
still keep the conditions of the regulated market, the SMT. Nonetheless, while, in the case
of a free price contract, supplier selection can be exercised amongst a multiplicity of firms;
in the case of regulated price, the contract must be stipulated with a designated company, to
which, in the discussion, we will refer to as incumbent. The incumbent is a firm holding the
authorisation to offer the SMT in a specific area. Prior to 2007 rearrangements, electricity
distribution companies could deal with retailing as well. Since 2007, as established by
Law№ 125/07, electricity distribution must be carried out under the unbundling regime
with respect to sales activity. Hence, vertically integrated companies were unbundled in
order to create sister companies entrusted with either the management of distribution or
the retail sale activities.12 Consistently with the level of data disaggregation adopted for
the empirical analysis presented in the third chapter, we are providing in the next pages
an overview of the retail market structure in terms of active suppliers among the Italian
provinces. To support this, choropleth maps will be employed.
11Directive (EU)№ 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5th June 2019 on common
rules for the internal market for electricity.
12Few years later, Legislative Decree№ 93/2011 & Resolution№ 296/2015/R/COM established that big
vertically integrated companies must not create ambiguity in their policy communication and trademark,
regarding the distinct identity of distribution, SMT and free market branches and enforced a separation
amongst trademarks, too.
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1.2.1 Free Market Suppliers
In contrast to what happens in the regulated market, residential consumers who decide to
join the free market can select their counterparty from a multiplicity of providers. A wide
range of contracts, differentiated both in terms of how the energy usage is charged and
billed and for the presence of any ancillary services, is available in the free market. In
general, depending on their preferences, consumers can choose from a variety of options,
such as fixed or variable prices, single-rate or multi-rate tariffs (applying different tariff
rates for different days and for various times during the day), free market conditions or
PLACET13 (conditions equivalent to those of the SMT) and so on.
The number of active free market providers constantly fluctuates due to market
entry/exit by firms. Nonetheless, over the last few years, the trend in the number of retail
suppliers to residential consumers in the free market has been increasing relentlessly. In
particular, in 2012 the total number of companies was 146.14 According to ARERA’s
public registry,15 as of April 2020, the total number of suppliers is 593. However, only
47 of them are active across the whole Italian territory and 65 of them operate in more
than 100 provinces. On average, 184 firms in each province supply electricity to the free
market consumers. As shown in Fig 1.1, the most populous provinces are those where
there is the greatest number of active providers. As a matter of fact, Milan, Rome, Turin
and Naples, the four most populous areas, lead the ranking with 331, 307, 278 and 266
providers respectively. As a whole, correlation between total inhabitants and the number
of distinct providers is equal to 0.79. While the populousness of the provinces seems to
be relevant, it does not seem possible to detect a clear pattern as far as macro-region are
concerned. Provinces in Northern Italy count 188 different active operators, which is
slightly above average. On the other hand, if we consider Central Italy and Southern Italy,
for both macro-regions the average number of retail sellers by province is 180. Despite
these numbers, as we will more extensively discuss in the next chapter, the vast majority
of residential consumers is served by the three biggest groups.16
13PLACET is the Italian acronym of Prezzo Libero A Condizioni Equiparate Di Tutela.
14Source: ARERA. (2019). Monitoraggio retail. Rapporto per l’anno 2018. Graph№ 4.5, p. 53.
15Source: http://www.arera.it/ModuliDinamiciPortale/reportistica/searchOperatori.
16C3 index reported by ARERA relative to consumers in the free market during 2018 was equal to 67,0%.
10


















































































































Source: Authors’ elaboration from ARERA public databases using STATA ‘spmap’ command.
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1.2.2 SMT Suppliers
Residential consumers who have not yet chosen a supplier in the free market are entitled
to be served under the SMT regime. In this case, the relation between the customer and
the commercial counterparty is strictly regulated both in terms of contractual conditions
and in terms of price, which is set by the national authority. At the beginning of each
new quarter, ARERA does indeed fix the prices that will be in force during the ensuing
three months. Residential consumers are allowed to choose between a two-rate tariff or a
single-rate tariff. In case the former applies, the price is differentiated between two daily
bands: the F1 band, which is generally linked to a higher cost per kilowatt hour, runs from
8am to 7pm from Monday to Friday, excluding national holidays; the F23 band, which
generally costs less, tracks consumption running from 7pm to 8am from Monday to Friday
and at all hours on Saturdays, Sundays and national holidays. In each case, the energy
supplier managing customer care, billing and payments processes cannot be freely chosen
by the SMT user: it must be the one associated in a univocal manner to the ZIP code area
where the Point-of-Delivery is located, instead.
There are 131 SMT suppliers in Italy. However, the biggest one, Servizio Elettrico
Nazionale (SEN), part of the Enel Group, covers the 91.78% of total municipalities. Acea,
A2A and Iren, local suppliers of Rome, Milan and Turin17 respectively, follow SEN in
terms of coverage. The remaining SMT providers comprehend local firms, generally
supplying at most a few, usually close, cities. The average number of suppliers by province
for North of Italy is 3, for Central Italy is 1.77, for South of Italy is 1.59. There is no
correlation18 between the number of SMT suppliers and inhabitants in the area and it is
no possible to detect a clear pattern regarding regions, apart from the high number of
providers in Trentino-Alto Adige (Fig. 1.2 p.13). This is because, net of minor changes,
the current partition is the inheritance stemming from the unbundling of vertical firms
which were managing distribution, too. Thus, even today, SMT suppliers usually belongs
to the same group providing distribution services.
17Iren is the authorised SMT supplier for the city of Parma, too.
18Correlation found between number of SMT suppliers and inhabitants is 0.07.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from ARERA public databases using STATA ‘spmap’ command.
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1.2.3 Distribution System Operators
In order to sustain the aforementioned match between the firms providing the SMT
and those which manage the distribution service, we attach a choropleth map showing
the number of DSOs active in each Italian province (Fig. 1.3). A part from few
cases,19 maps can be overlapped, as the provinces largely fall within the same classes as
in Fig. 1.2. Further evidence stems from a comparison between maps showing the SMT
provider and the DSO operating in each Italian municipality, attached in Fig. A.1 p.51.
Firms belonging to the same parent company share the same colour in different hues.
It seems clear that in the vast majority of municipalities a single corporate group’s
subsidiaries are entitled to exercise both electricity distribution activities and the retail
under the SMT. Since Law № 125/07 came into effect, establishing the unbundling of
distribution and retail, only minor rearrangements occurred. On closer inspection, we
may notice the vastness of the Enel Group coverage over the territory. Thus, as far as
distribution and regulated retail branch are concerned, Enel still emerges as a huge
national incumbent. However, some areas are characterised by the presence of multiple
local incumbents. For this reason, in the next chapters, we will exploit such variability
in order to try and identify any relationship between incumbency and the competition
level, measured in terms of free market participation and switch rate.
19The only differences regard: Sondrio, Brescia, Venice, Ancona, Pescara, Foggia, Sassari and the
missing data in the province of Sud Sardegna.
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Consumer Inertia and Switching
Within the context of a liberalised market, an increase in competition is to be expected.
Overall, the main objectives of competition are to foster the quality of the services,
while encouraging the emergence of innovation, and to lower prices. The switching
rate of consumers is a crucial indicator for assessing the competitiveness in the service
sector. As far as the electricity markets –and energy markets as a whole– are concerned,
official reports and empirical research shed light on the phenomenon of relatively low
switching rates and a lack of consumer engagement. The Italian retail electricity market
is no exception (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 2020). Residential
consumers, in particular, exhibit poor interest and knowledge with regard to the chance
to switch energy provider. Many factors can be identified as responsible for this. Both
monetary and behavioural reasons, such as search costs and perceived low savings or
loyalty to the incumbent and mistrust towards new entrants, are often imputed to consumer
inertia. In the specific Italian context, the persistence of a hybrid regime and the repeated
deadline postponement for the phase-out of regulated prices may have induced consumers
to avoid and procrastinate the choice, thus contributing to amplify consumer inertia. In
this chapter, we will review the literature on the topic. Finally, we will frame the current




As long as service providers are concerned, several variables affect consumer switching.
Bansal, Taylor and St. James (2005) propose three broad categories within which they
may be subsumed:
• push variables, that involve consumer perception about the incumbent’s features,
such as service quality, price and reliability;
• mooring variables, i.e. characteristics facilitating the switching process, that can be
consumer-specific (such as her or his natural propensity to switch) or related to the
context where the switch takes place (such as norms, explicit or implicit barriers,
switching costs);
• pull variables, i.e. positive factors driving consumers to alternative firms, such as
competitor attractiveness, in terms of innovative way of making business, higher
quality, lower prices and so on.
Research seems to agree that electricity services can be treated as relatively homo-
geneous goods (Bye & Hope, 2005; Joskow & Tirole, 2006) and that in the, renewed,
liberalised environment consumers are expected to be seeking low prices (Watson, Viney
& Schomaker, 2002; Defeuilley, 2009). Given the homogeneity of the product, the extent
to which the quality of the electricity service can be improved is very limited (Littlechild,
2002), especially if we consider that the observance of quality standards is thoroughly
monitored and supervised by the national authority. Thus, consumer choice is implausibly
determined by the quality of the electricity service. In some cases, homogeneous goods
passively undergo differentiation after they are purchased, in the sense that consumers
do not find convenient to change supplier, because a cost is attached to the switching
process (lock-in effect). In other words, homogeneous goods are susceptible to switching
costs (Klemperer, 1987). To some extent, firms do try to actively differentiate their
proposals by bundling electricity in dual-fuel1 offers or together with additional services
(such as internet subscription, mobile plans, sale of devices on finance, insurance and
1Bundles which supply both electricity and gas.
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so on). However, observed switching rates data suggest that the competitive dynamics
are inhibited. Residential consumers are reported to be quite idle, in the sense they do
not behave in a responsive manner when cheaper alternatives are available in the retail
electricity market. For this reason, additional aspects determining consumer choice must
be taken into account.
Variables affecting consumer decision in the field of energy markets are commonly
divided into two macro-categories: traditional economic factors, associated with the
pursuit of value for money (maximising satisfaction and minimising associated costs), and
behavioural (or psychological) factors, linked to consumer attitudes to utility products
(Klemperer, 1995; He & Reiner, 2017).
Several empirical studies have investigated those determinants. We will show below
results among those we think are relevant for the present analysis. In general, switching
costs are identified whenever customers give up benefits stemming from changing supplier.
In the case of homogeneous products, consumers renounce to exploit cheaper alternatives
and stick to their current supplier (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007).
Analysis performed on a sample of Swedish households revealed that price affects
the switching decision when the consumer is a bargain hunter, while it turned to be not
significant for passive agents (Sturluson, 2002).
Similarly, Rowlands, Parker and Scott (2004), conducting a survey on a sample of
consumers in Ontario (Canada), find that consumers prone to switch consider price as
the factor with the highest impact on their decision, while consumers averse to switch
judge reliability of competitors as the most important feature. This result may suggest that
brand-loyalty plays a crucial role in determining the decision to stay with the incumbent.
The latter indeed let them spare the effort needed to find trustworthy new entrants.
Analysing consumer switching behaviour in Netherlands residential energy markets,
Pomp and Shestalova (2007) show that switching costs in terms of search costs and learning
costs2 are factors affecting consumer probability to switch provider. By computing implicit
switching costs perceived by customers, it appears that incumbents can raise prices 75
euros per year above competitors and still preserve profitability, thus absorbing free
2Time spent to gather information and compare offers.
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market gains that are supposed to benefit households.
Deller et al. (2017) examine a sample of households willing to take part in a collective
switch scheme3 and find that they could not fully exploit economic opportunities. When
analysing the reasons why households seemingly leave ‘money on the table’, non-monetary
preferences are identified. The detection of consumers deliberately keeping more
expensive contracts may bring into question the fact that energy is unanimously considered
as a homogeneous product. However, time pressure and concerns about the switching
process are reported to be some of the causes for non-switchers preventing them to change
supplier, thus, the hypothesis that the status quo preference may be instilled by the implied
switching costs cannot be ruled out.
Wilson and Price (2010) question the presumption of the positive role generally
ascribed to consumers in improving market competition. By analysing the UK retail
electricity market, notwithstanding controls for possible deceiving sales activities and
bias for particular tariff structures, a limited underlying capacity of consumers to select
providers is found: not only do they lose a part of gains available, by not choosing the
cheapest offers, but also they reduce their surplus as a result of switching, by oddly
selecting more expensive contracts. This phenomenon seems to be exacerbated when
many alternative competitors are available, confirming the impact of search costs and
learning costs.
Studying the Danish market, Yang (2014) finds that consumers attribute low predictive
power to perceived economic benefits with respect to switching intention and stresses
the importance of the implementation of measures simplifying the switching process and
making sceptical consumers more aware of the positive consequences of switching.
Shin and Managi (2017) find that for Japanese households economic benefits and
customer satisfaction matter, along with fixed price contracts. Moreover, household
and individual characteristic may affect switching. Higher number of family members,
unemployment status, house ownership, living in large cities4 are associated with a higher
switching rate.
3The results on such a self-selected sample are reported to typify an upper-bound in evaluating
engagement in the UK market.
4On the contrary, Fontana, Iori and Nava (2017), studying the Italian case, attribute a negative power to
living in a large city in determining the probability to switch.
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Table 2.1. Summary of switching rates determinants according to literature
Author(s) Year Country Explanatory Variables Relation
Sturluson 2002 Sweden Economic benefits (+) for switch inclined(n.s.) for switch averse
Rowlands et al. 2004 Canada
Economic benefits (+) for switch inclined
Reliability (n.s.) for switch averse
Incumbency (-)
Deller et al. 2017 UK Time pressure (-) for switch inclinedMistrust vs. process (-) for switch inclined
Wilson & Price 2010 UK High # of competitors (-)
Yang 2014 Denmark
Mistrust vs. process (-)
Low perceived benefit (-)
Brand Loyalty (-)






Hortaçsu, Madanizadeh & Puller 2017 US Incumbency (-)Brand Loyalty (-)
Finally, Hortaçsu et al. (2017) examine data about Texas residential electricity market,
where, historically, vertically integrated utilities managed the service with regulated prices.
The average price of the incumbent was systematically higher than entrants. However,
consumers kept purchasing electricity from the incumbent, displaying inertia. This attitude,
attributable to brand loyalty versus the incumbent or search frictions, prevented them
from saving until 12.47$ per month.5 Thus, the presence of former vertically integrated
incumbents seems to generate inertia in the sense that consumers, by maintaining the
contract with a trustworthy incumbent, lose incentive to frequently consider offerings
of alternative providers and, even when they do, they leave to incumbents a significant
advantage.
Tab. 2.1 reports the main results revealed by the economic literature and herein
discussed.
5Median: 7.63$ per month.
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2.2 Inertia in the Italian Market
In 2019 recorded switching rate in the Italian retail electricity market was higher than
previous years (Fig. 2.2 p.25). It should be noted, however, that consumers may have
been pushed to switch to the free market by the deadline for the phase-out of the regulated
regime, which was expected for 1st July, 2020 (ACER, 2020).
In the aggregate, the Italian market is not exempt from consumer inertia. Thirteen
years after the process of liberalisation started, consumers still exhibit low engagement,
resulting in high market concentration.
2.2.1 Market Concentration
The Italian electricity retail market is still very concentrated, especially if we consider the
residential branch. The simultaneous presence of a regulated market may have exacerbated
the inertia of residential consumers. In fact, if we consider the low-voltage non-residential
market, for which the possibility of maintaining the contract in the SMT is also conceived,
the market shares are distributed more uniformly. According to 2019 Retail Market
Monitoring Report by ARERA, the Enel group bills 69.8% of the energy consumed in
the residential sector as a whole (Tab. B.1 p.54). This percentage drops considerably if
we consider the low-voltage non-residential branch (38.6%).6 However, at present, the
relevance of SMT enables us only to speculate about the degree of competitiveness that
will be determined in the sector when the liberalisation process will have fully unfolded
its effects. For the sake of congruence, we can examine the market shares relatively to the
free market only, so that there is no bias due to the considerable weight that the SMT still
holds. Still, in spite of SMT shares being ruled out, the top 5 corporate groups operating
in the SMT hold 62.1% of total residential free market. This value drops to 39.7% for
the low-voltage non-residential branch (ARERA, 2019b). Through a quick comparison
between Fig. 2.1a and Fig 2.1b (p.23), it is possible to detect the discrepancy in the free
market concentration between the residential and the low-voltage non-residential branch.
6It drops even more in the medium-voltage non-residential branch (20.4%). However, it must be noted
that since these shares concern the energy consumed, there could be a self-selection problem, in the sense
that customers with lower average consumption choose Enel while those with higher consumption choose
other suppliers.
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Figure 2.1. Free market concentration. The green bars represent the HHI. The yellow line, red line and
blue line represent C1, C2 and C3 indices, respectively.












































































Source: own elaboration (based on ARERA databases).
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Table 2.2. Concentration in residential and non-residential market.
Year C1_res C1_nr C2_res C2_nr C3_res C3_nr HHI_res HHI_nr
2012 50.2% 27.2% 62.0% 33.4% 72.8% 39.4% 2 849 956
2013 49.8% 26.9% 63.0% 33.0% 72.4% 37.8% 2 810 920
2014 49.4% 25.0% 64.7% 33.5% 73.4% 38.6% 2 802 853
2015 49.9% 22.9% 64.8% 27.6% 71.4% 31.9% 2 809 700
2016 50.4% 24.5% 64.6% 29.3% 69.8% 33.4% 2 822 766
2017 50.5% 25.9% 63.9% 30.7% 68.4% 34.3% 2 803 823
2018 49.3% 26.9% 62.2% 32.0% 67.0% 35.6% 2 673 879
Source: ARERA databases.
In Fig. 2.1, C1, C2 and C3 indices represent the market share held respectively by the
first corporate group, the first two corporate groups and the first three corporate groups
in the free market in terms of energy (kWh) billed. The first group holds about the half
of the market as regards the residential branch. When considering the market share of
the first three groups,7 it is possible to notice that over the last years it has been usually
decreasing (a part from year 2014). At the end of 2018, the first three group held two
third of the residential free market. The values are nearly halved when the low-voltage
non-residential market is taken into consideration.
The green bars (Fig 2.1) represent the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), computed
as the sum of squared values of market shares and ranging from 0 (perfect competition)
to 10000 (monopoly). As a rule of thumb, values over 2500 are associated with critical
competitive dynamics and high concentration. Values between 1500 and 2500 are
on the threshold and require an in-depth analysis. Values under 1500 symbolise an
unconcentrated industry (US Department of Justice, 2010). The HHI for the residential
market decreased in 2018. However, it is still very large and depicts a highly concentrated
industry. The HHI for the low-voltage non-residential market is below 1000, which
suggests an unconcentrated industry. Tab. 2.2 reports the discussed indices in detail.
7Namely, Enel, ENI and Edison.
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2.2.2 Switching
The number of consumers who do not switch is still high. The reasons associated
with this phenomenon are various, ranging from regulatory barriers to behavioural
factors. The presence itself of a hybrid regime can represent a form of regulatory barrier,
especially if regulated prices are set below competitive prices (ACER, 2020). Actually,
in the competitive branch of the Italian electricity retail market, during period 2013-
2018, it was always possible to find cheaper prices than those fixed by the regulatory
authority Magnani, Manenti and Valbonesi (2020). Despite that, in 2018, 56.51%
of total PODs (Tab. B.2 p.55) was still served by the SMT, while only 43.49% by the
free market; that is, the majority of consumers had never once switched provider. Of
course, the competitive market has been gaining ground during the last years, but, as
shown in Fig. 2.2 the transition to a competitive market is far from being completed, as
half of the market share is still supplied by the SMT.
Figure 2.2. SMT vs free market share & switching rate (2008-2019). Values on the left are expressed as

































Source: own elaboration (based on ARERA databases).
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This is especially evident if we consider that, while consumers decide to exit
the regulated market, the vast majority subscribes a contract with free market sup-
pliers belonging to the same group as the SMT. Fig. 2.3 illustrates this phenomenon.
About 60% of the SMT exits8 is directed towards firms of the same group. Since
the authorisation to provide the SMT service is held in most of the Italian territory
by one incumbent (see Fig. A.1 p.51), the high ratio of exits towards the same group may
result in a high level of concentration even once the liberalisation process will be over.
This phenomenon, which may be associated with consumer tendency to stick to the
incumbent rather than sifting through company offers, guarantees a significant advantage
to the incumbent. In this sense, residential consumers perceive higher switching costs
when it comes to leave the incumbent.


















Jan-12 Jan-14 Jan-16 Jan-18 Jan-20
Exit towards other group Exit towards same group
Exit towards same group (% over total)
Source: own elaboration (based on ARERA databases).
8Total of exit from SMT distinguished between those referring to customers who have chosen to exit
SMT by signing a contract with a supplier connected to the electricity distributor or with another supplier
on the free market.
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Possible explanations for the higher ‘perceived’ switching costs in the residential
electricity market are:
• low perceived economic benefits;
• search and learning costs, exacerbated by the high number of competitors,9 which
makes the comparison even more demanding and time-consuming (Fontana et al.,
2017);
• reliability of the incumbent and brand loyalty;
• mistrust versus new entrants.
Magnani, Manenti and Valbonesi (2020) do estimate switching costs stemming from
exiting the three biggest firms in the competitive branch of the Italian retail electricity
market. Exiting the biggest one, which is the national incumbent, is perceived to be much
more expensive. As a result, for the last five years, the incumbent has been gradually
increasing its share in the free market, to the detriment of competitors.




Inertia and Incumbency: an empirical
analysis
This last chapter focuses on our empirical analysis. We investigate the relation between
incumbency and the observed consumer inertia in the Italian retail electricity market.
As suggested by Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (2020) and several
research results,1 residential consumers may grant the incumbent an advantage. In the
Italian case, the regulated regime, still coexisting with the free market, is provided by
a national incumbent and few other local firms, generally supplying at most a small
number of close cities. This structure allows us to examine how the numerousness of
incumbents may produce discrepancy in the switching rate across the Italian territory.
In the first section, we will present the data employed, justifying the choices made
and displaying the descriptive statistics for the main variables. In the second section,
we will show the results obtained and provide possible explanations as well as policy
suggestions.
1See Tab. 2.1, p.21.
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3.1 Data and Sources
Low switching rate is commonly associated to consumer disengagement. Since the core of
our analysis is to assess whether the latter depends on the differences in the structure of the
regulated market across Italy, we will employ the variable switching rate as the dependent
variable. Data regarding observed switching rates for year 2019 have been recovered from
ARERA’s website,2 which published them for the first time in July 2020 at the provincial
level.3 The switching rate is expressed as the ratio of switching Points-of-Delivery with
respect to the total number of active PODs, that is the share of consumers who changed
their supplier during year 2019, net of SMT exits towards the same group.4 The average
switching rate by province is 14.5% (Tab. 3.1). However, the min/max band suggests that
some provinces are more involved into switching dynamics than others. In map B.1 (p.53),
we provide a broader view of the discrepancy in the switching rate across Italy.
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for the variables employed.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Switching 107 0.1451 0.0222 0.0580 0.2023
DSOs 107 5.6031 9.3351 0.6153 90.366
SMT_suppliers 106 5.7103 9.7045 0.6153 94.130
E.dist_share 107 0.9097 0.2144 0.0000 1.0000
Free_market 107 0.5153 0.0676 0.3467 0.6837
Unemployment 107 0.1042 0.0577 0.0290 0.2884
Schooling 107 0.4554 0.0422 0.3482 0.5932
Over65 107 0.2377 0.0239 0.1750 0.2910
Net_income 107 31084 4408.3 22745 37892
2Source: https://www.arera.it/allegati/dati/monitoraggioretail//swprovincia.xlsx.
3Previous to 2020, data were published at the regional level only.
4Switching rate thus includes both changes from one free market supplier to another and changes from
the incumbent SMT supplier to a free market supplier. Nonetheless, SMT exits towards a free market
supplier belonging to the same group are counted out.
Source: https://www.arera.it/it/dati/mr/switchbar.htm.
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In the second stage of our analysis, we introduce one additional dependent variable,
which is the rate of participation in the free market, available on ARERA’s website.5 It
represents the portion of consumers who have left the SMT since 2007 and are served by
a firm operating in the free market as of December 2019.
The number of incumbents operating in each province is the main explanatory variable
on which we will focus. Incumbency data, retrieved from ARERA’s registry,6 are
expressed in terms of number of SMT suppliers operating in each municipality. However,
the variable included few missing data, resulting in the absence of a whole province.
Therefore, we opted for the number of DSOs (per million inhabitants) by province as a
measure of incumbency. DSOs distribution across Italy mirrors the SMT suppliers’ one,
as we have previously shown.7 Given the magnitude of the Enel Group in providing the
SMT – through the subsidiary Servizio Elettrico Nazionale S.p.A. – and the distribution
service – through the subsidiary E-distribuzione S.p.A. –, we included E.dist_share, which
represents the coverage of the distribution service under the Enel Group in each province
(measured as share of inhabitants covered).
Coherently with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, we input in our model the
following socio-demographic variables for year 2019 published by ISTAT:8
• unemployment rate, measured as portion of population which is currently not working
but in search of a job;
• schooling, which represents the percentage of 18+ inhabitants who got at least a
high-school diploma;
• over65, that is the share of 65+ inhabitants;
• net_income is the average disposable income per capita in each Italian province;
Finally, we will include the dummy variables at the regional level,9 in order to capture the
residual effects due to socio-demographic inter-regional differences.
Descriptive statistics for the aforementioned variables are reported in Tab. 3.1
5Source: https://www.arera.it/allegati/dati/monitoraggioretail/mlprov.xlsx.
6Source: https://www.arera.it/ModuliDinamiciPortale/reportistica/compilaRicerca.
7See: Fig. A.1 p.51.
8ISTAT is the Italian National Institute of Statistics.
9The dummy variables identify 20 categories, namely the number of regions in Italy.
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3.2 Analysis
In order to measure the effect of incumbency on the switching rate, the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) method is used to construct our regression in the first place. To better
identify the effects of our main explanatory variable, we gradually increase the number of
variables considered. Cluster-robust standard errors at the regional level are computed.10
In specifying the model, log-transformations of the dependent variables and of the
socio-demographic controls are taken:
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑠
+ 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽4𝐸 .𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑠 ∗ 𝐸 .𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
+ 𝜙𝑘−1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑢1,
(3.1)
where 𝑘 = (2, ..., 20) , indexing Italian regions.
Subsequently, we will extend our analysis by implementing a Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUREG) model, which allows us to run two regression equations predict-
ing both switching rate and free_market, whose error terms could be correlated. We
use a slightly different set of explanatory variables, as required by SUREG model.11
Therefore, along with Eq. 3.1, we define:
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝑀𝑎𝑟 𝑘𝑒𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑠
+ 𝛾2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟65 + 𝛾3𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
+ 𝛾4𝐸 .𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛾5𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑠 ∗ 𝐸 .𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
+ 𝜓𝑘−1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑢2,
(3.2)
where 𝑘 = (2, ..., 20) , indexing Italian regions.
10Heteroscedasticity tests are displayed in Appendix C, Tab. C.6 p.61. In Tab. C.7 p.61, multi-collinearity
tests are available.




In this subsection, we show the main results of our analysis. In Tab. 3.2 outputs of
OLS regression treating Switching as dependent variable are reported. The number of
DSOs is found to have a negative impact on the switching rate in OLS (1) and OLS (2).
Suspecting that this effect could be tied to the share of PODs covered by the national
incumbent in each province, we add the continuous interaction term DSOs∗E.dist_share,
which allows us to assess the average effect of one additional incumbent with respect to
different levels of presence of the Enel Group. Once we control for the regional effects in
OLS (4) (Tab. 3.2),12 we observe that the interaction term coefficient is negative (-0.012)
and statistically significant (p-value 0.042). The average negative effect of one additional
incumbent seems to be exacerbated when the coverage by the national incumbent is higher.
Table 3.2. Switching OLS regression.
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
VARIABLES Switching Switching Switching Switching
DSOs -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Unemployment -0.048 -0.069* -0.001
(0.039) (0.035) (0.052)







Observations 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.234 0.252 0.388 0.754
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note:
Full output reported in Appendix C (Tab. C.3 p.58).
Interaction’s marginal effects w.r.t. OLS (4) in Appendix C (Tab. C.1, p.57).
12In OLS (3), which does not include regional effects, the interaction term coefficient is close but above
the significance level (p-value: 0.107).
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Table 3.3. SUREG regression and correlation matrix of residuals.



















Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Correlation matrix of residual
Switching 1.0000
Free_market 0.4536 1.0000
Breutsch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(1) = 22.012, Pr = 0.0000
Note:
Full output reported in Appendix C (Tab. C.4 p.59).
Interaction’s marginal effects in Tab. 3.4 & Tab. 3.5, p.36.
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Indeed, the significant coefficient of the continuous variables’ interaction term
in OLS (4) (Tab. 3.2, p.33) suggests that the presence of the Enel Group determines
the extent to which the numerousness of DSOs impacts on the switching rate. In order
to verify whether this is the case, we decide to investigate how the number of local
incumbents and the magnitude of the national incumbent in each province affect the
other variable of interest, i.e. the rate of participation in the free market.
We expect the decision to switch provider and the participation in the free mar-
ket to be determined by similar factors. In fact, even though, when joining the
free market, the majority of consumers does not change supplier, but rather stay
within the same corporate group – as we have shown in Fig. 2.3 (p.26); still, both
switching and participating in the free market are forms of consumer engagement.
In this sense, we believe that unobservable characteristics may affect both; in other
words, Switching’s and Free_market’s error terms may be correlated. For this reason,
we estimate both variables as dependent variables using a SUREG model,13 which
– by estimating parameters of the two equations simultaneously – exploits information
of one equation to improve the other and vice versa and produce higher efficiency gains
the higher is the correlation among error terms of the two equations (Zellner, 1962;
Baltagi et al., 1998).
Tab. 3.3 displays the results found. The interaction term captures the effects
on Switching and Free_market. On the one hand, a higher presence of the national
incumbent is associated with a reduction in the marginal effect of DSOs on Switching;
on the other hand, the effect of one additional incumbent, whilst still producing a
negative effect on the rate of participation in the free market, lessens as the presence
of the national incumbent intensifies. Besides, according to the Breutsch-Pagan test
of independence of residuals – shown at the bottom of Tab 3.3 –, the null hypothesis
of independence of errors across the two equations can be rejected with a chi-squared
statistic equal to 22.012 and a very low p-value, confirming the conjecture that error
13As a complement, we also provide the output of the OLS regression with regard to the variable
Free_market as the dependent in Tab. C.5 p.60. In that case, interaction term’s p-value is 0.107, thus
close but beyond statistical significance.
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Table 3.4. Marginal effects of # of DSOs on Switching in SUREG.
E.dist_share DSOs dy/dx Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval]
0 0.003035 0.001799 1.69 0.092 -0.00049 0.006561
0.5 -0.00259 0.001712 -1.52 0.13 -0.00595 0.000761
0.6 -0.00372 0.001913 -1.94 0.052 -0.00747 0.000030
0.7 -0.00485 0.002157 -2.25 0.025 -0.00907 -0.00062
0.8 -0.00597 0.002431 -2.46 0.014 -0.01074 -0.00121
0.9 -0.0071 0.002726 -2.6 0.009 -0.01244 -0.00175
0.95 -0.00766 0.002879 -2.66 0.008 -0.0133 -0.00202
Note:
Body-text regression reported in Tab. 3.3, p.34.
Full output reported in Appendix C (Tab. C.4 p.59).
Table 3.5. Marginal effects of # of DSOs on Free_Market in SUREG.
E.dist_share DSOs dy/dx Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval]
0 -0.02894 0.009871 -2.93 0.003 -0.04829 -0.0096
0.5 -0.01607 0.004518 -3.56 0.000 -0.02493 -0.00722
0.6 -0.0135 0.003575 -3.78 0.000 -0.02051 -0.00649
0.7 -0.01092 0.002781 -3.93 0.000 -0.01638 -0.00547
0.8 -0.00835 0.002297 -3.64 0.000 -0.01285 -0.00385
0.9 -0.00578 0.002326 -2.48 0.013 -0.01034 -0.00122
0.95 -0.00449 0.002539 -1.77 0.077 -0.00947 0.000486
Note:
Body-text regression reported in Tab. 3.3, p.34.
Full output reported in Appendix C (Tab. C.4 p.59).
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terms in the two equations correlate and thus validating the implementation of a SUREG
model. More detailed insights with regard to the interaction term can be found in Tab.
3.4 & Tab. 3.5 (p.36). Therein, we report the average marginal effects of the number
of DSOs on the dependent variables for those we consider to be pertinent14 levels
of E.dist_share. Note that in the absence of the national incumbent, one additional
competitor may even increase switching rates; instead, as the national incumbent’s
share increases, the effect becomes more and more negative.15 By comparison, as
concerns the participation in the free market, a higher number of DSOs is generally
associated with lower rates, but such an effect is tempered when the presence of Enel
Group increases.
The discrepancy in the marginal effect generated by the numerousness of incumbents
may be due to the fact that, when sharing the provision of SMT and distribution services
with the biggest incumbent, local firms are more likely to retain consumers within the
SMT, which would explain the lower free market participation rate associated with
lower presence of the Enel Group. Accordingly, the higher the presence of the national
incumbent, the more conservative the strategy adopted by small local incumbents.
Retaining consumers within the SMT would indeed ensure local incumbents moderate,
but ‘safer’ earnings. Alternatively, the Enel Group, by exploiting economies of scale
and its historical brand, may be more capable of leading consumers to the free market
branch.
On the other hand, these very same consumers, once moved to the free market,
may have no incentive to further switch to other providers, which would explain
the pejorative effect that a larger coverage by Enel has on the inherently inhibited
14The selection is based both on the frequency of data distribution and on statistical significance.
15While, in general, provinces with the highest number of DSOs, such as Bolzano, Aosta and Trento
have low switching rates and provinces with only one incumbent, such as Pescara, Isernia, Biella have
higher switching rates, the above-mentioned relation is particularly evident with regard to provinces
located in the same region and exhibiting different switching rates. For instance, Vercelli, Verona,
Brescia, Trieste, Frosinone, Salerno and Agrigento exhibit higher switching rates than Verbano-Cusio-
Ossola, Vicenza, Monza-Brianza, Udine, Rieti, Avellino and Enna respectively. Despite sharing the
same number of DSOs, the latter are in fact more largely covered by the Enel Group than the former.
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competitive dynamics. In this sense, results seem to evidence the presence of a ‘lock-in’
effect in the free market. In other words, consumers tend to stick to the national
incumbent, as it can be inferred by the high percentage of consumers that, exiting the
SMT, subscribe a contract in the free market with the supplier of the same corporate
group (Fig. 2.3, p.26). This phenomenon, in turn, generates high market concentration
with regard to the shares held by suppliers operating in the free market (Fig. 2.1a, p.
23 and Tab. B.1, p. 54).
3.2.2 Limits and Shortcomings
It must be noted that our analysis presents several limits, which we illustrate hereinafter.
• Although data employed were the only publicly available about the topic, the
province-level switching rates published in 2020 provide us only 107 observations,
which may be not sufficiently fit to validate the results. A time-series of the
switching rates by province would be useful to better validate the relationship
existing between variables. Moreover, the implementation of a panel-data analysis
would allow us to grasp the time dimension of the phenomenon.
• Additional variables, which we believe to be pertinent in explaining the propensity
to switch energy providers, may be integrated into the analysis. For instance, in
view of the number of offers made available by suppliers on their websites only
and the presence of on-line tools that facilitate the comparison between offers,16 a
measure of internet penetration could be taken into consideration.17 Furthermore,
in the literature, house ownership is also found to have an impact on consumer
engagement in the energy markets. House owners are generally more prone to
actively search for alternatives. Thus, it could represent an additional explanatory
factor to be included in our analysis.
16E.g.: Portale Offerte, made available by ARERA, includes offers of all major firms and computes
estimated yearly spending, ranking offers from the cheapest to the most expensive.
17Admittedly, the variable Over65, which represents the percentage of inhabitants above 65 years and
is found to have a negative effect on the participation in the free market, may somehow capture also the
low propensity to use the internet.
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• The comparison between the two dependent variables involves a ‘flow’ variable,
Switching, and a ‘stock’ variable, Free_market. On the one hand, this gave us
the opportunity to assess the effect of incumbency on correlated, but different
phenomena. As previously mentioned, switching rates count every change of
provider, including transitions from one free market provider to another, but net
of SMT exits towards firms of the same group; while the free market rate merely
counts the number of PODs in the free market over the total, thus giving a stock
dimension of the transitions from the regulated to the competitive regime occurred
since 2007 and, unlike switching, also including exits from the SMT towards
free market firms of the same group. On the other hand, if the same format was
available for both variables, results would be more homogeneously comparable.
• Besides, the increase in switching shown in Fig. 2.2 (p.25), determined to some
degree by the expected end of the SMT, makes year 2019 atypical (ACER, 2020).
Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that the removal of the regulated prices has
been delayed several times prior to 2019. The existence of previous occurrences
may have led both energy companies and residential consumers to perceive the end
of regulated prices as an unreliable announcement. For this reason, they may have
expected a further delay and acted accordingly. In other words, the push towards
the free market generated by the announcement could have been attenuated by the
previous non-fulfilments.
• This work does not take into consideration contractual renegotiations, which
are generally considered as a measure of ‘internal’ switching. While it is true
that contractual renegotiations do not affect the rate of participation in the free
market, they do have an impact on ‘external’ switching. Favourable contractual
renegotiations may indeed deter consumers to switch provider for better conditions.
Internal switching is thus relevant for assessing consumer engagement, because it
represents a form of interest in the free market dynamics exhibited by the consumer.
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3.2.3 Policy implications
In our work, we found that incumbency affects switching rates. In particular, the presence
of a national incumbent exacerbates consumer inertia. In such an environment, residential
consumers tend to stick to the well-known brand of the incumbent and they are even
willing to accept paying higher prices (incumbency premium). The incumbent, in turn,
preserves an advantage over competitors. This suggests that policy-makers need to better
enlighten consumers about the opportunities that can be exploited by switching providers.
In this sense, tools like Portale Offerte,18 and the expense comparability sheet19
represent valuable resources. Portale Offerte is an institutional website hosted by ARERA
allowing consumers to easily compare different proposals. The expense comparability
sheet20 is a prospectus, compulsorily disclosed by electricity retailers, summarising the
economic conditions for each of the available offers. It also features the comparison
of the estimated annual expenditure21 that the customer would incur by accepting the
new proposal with respect to the expenditure generated by the SMT. By simplifying
the comparison between competitive with regulated prices, the document represents a
powerful tool to foster customers’ consciousness with respect to the transition to the free
market.
This kind of resources evidently permits to lower the costs associated with the time
spent by consumers sifting through the various offers (i.e., search and learning costs).
Enhancing the visibility of Portale Offerte and expense comparibility sheet would be
helpful in enlarging their user base and consequently their beneficial effects.
One of the reasons consumers decide to stick to the incumbent is the perception
of low economic benefits stemming from switching supplier. This perception may be
ascribable to the fact that a large portion of energy bills is composed by fixed costs and
18Source: https://www.ilportaleofferte.it/portaleOfferte/.
19In italian: ‘Scheda di confrontabilità della spesa’.
20The specific details regarding the structure of this document are established by
Resolution№366/2018/R/com (ARERA).
21Estimates are based on standard consumption profiles identified by the Authority. More precisely, for
each level of consumption, savings or higher expenditure in terms of euros and as a percentage with respect
to the standard conditions of the SMT are specified.
40
taxes (Yang, 2014). As a result, energy operators are entrusted with less discretionary
room than it may seem in determining the total amount of energy bills. On the consumers’
perspective, the greater the portion of fixed costs, the lower the relative savings brought
by lower tariffs.
Furthermore, some consumers may even fail to disentangle costs charged by the
retailer from the remainder, resulting in biased expectations about the possible savings
generated by cheaper prices. Actually, electricity bills compulsorily label and specify the
various items of expenditure by type, also by means of explanatory graphs. However, a
number of consumers, perhaps deceived by the pre-liberalisation experience of a vertical
integrated single provider or simply affected by cognitive bias, may still fail to recognise
that only few of the bill’s entries they pay go to their electricity retail seller. Stressing the
effective recipients of each item of expenditure may help consumers adjust their saving
expectations with regard to the offers proposed by retailers. By so doing, the perception
of the economic benefits deriving from switching could become more straightforward.
As we have discussed in the previous chapters, the high number of active free market
providers – 593, as of April 2020 – exacerbates perceived switching costs for residential
consumers, making the comparison among different proposals more demanding and
time-consuming (Fontana et al., 2017). Besides, the majority of consumers concentrate
in a few well-known big firms. Oppositely, the bulk of active free market operators
holds a very small share. This type of firms might appear on consumers’ perspective less
reliable if compared to the most famous brands. However, being the electricity sector
highly regulated and supervised, authorised suppliers are reportedly trustworthy enough
to guarantee the maintenance of quality standards. Therefore, the regulatory authority
could improve its intervention aimed at reassuring residential consumers about the quality
of smaller competitors and their performances. More aware consumers would presumably




As a whole, the liberalisation of the Italian electricity sector is on the right track. It
must be noted, however, that residential consumers still exhibit scarce engagement,
which translates into inadequate levels of participation in the free market and relatively
low switching rates. On the one hand, the hybrid regime involving the coexistence
of regulated prices with competitive ones is still helpful in protecting those who are
not yet ready to navigate the free market. On the other hand, being the service at
regulated prices vastly provided by one big firm, incumbency advantage arises. As
a matter of fact, in presence of a well-known, formerly public, company, consumers
may lack incentive to switch. After all, switching produces costs. When perceived
economic benefits are low,22 spending time for finding a trustworthy supplier among
many may just not be worth the effort. Sticking to the incumbent undoubtedly requires
less commitment.
In this work, we empirically analysed the influence that the market structure has
on the Italian residential electricity sector competitive dynamics. We found that
incumbency, in terms of provision of the SMT and distribution service, may concretely
produce an effect on switching rates. In particular, the larger the presence of the national
incumbent, the more inhibited are the competitive dynamics in terms of switching.
Nevertheless, we also found that a larger coverage of SMT and distribution service
under the national incumbent is associated with an attenuation of consumers’ idleness
as long as participation in the free market is concerned. This result is coherent with
22A significant portion of energy bills consists of taxes and transmission costs, which make harder the
price comparison among different suppliers.
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the evidence of consumers that, when joining the free market, change commercial
counterparty but, in most of the cases, stay within the same corporate group. It also
suggests that the national incumbent, thanks to the economies of scale, may essentially
be better performing than smaller competitors in transferring its user base from the
regulated branch to its own free market branch. However, once they join the free market
with the incumbent, these very same consumers are less likely to further switch.
In view of these results, we believe that the largest operator effectively benefits an
incumbency advantage, due to concomitant factors such as the wide provision of SMT,
its well-known brand and consumers reluctance to subscribe contracts with smaller,
little-known, firms. In addition to the already implemented tools allowing their users
to easily browse through different commercial proposals, further quality controls and
reassurance by the regulatory authority about licensed suppliers’ reliability may be
useful to instil trust in residential consumers, who, in turn, would more confidently
navigate the free market.
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Figure A.1. Comparing SMT suppliers vs DSOs by municipality (click on the image to switch map). Same
colour has been assigned to firms belonging to the same Corporate Group (vivid hue for SMT providers, pallid
hue for DSOs). Legend order reflects coverage ranking (computed in terms of number of users served).





















































































































Source: Authors’ elaboration from ARERA public databases using STATA ‘spmap’ command.
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Table B.1. Market shares of the Top 10 corporate groups (in terms of amount of billed kWh).




SMT 47.2% 17.2% N.A.
Free Market 22.6% 20.8% 19.2%
Safeguard N.A. 0.5% 1.3%
Total 69.8% 38.6% 20.4%
ENI
SMT 0.0% 0.0% N.A.
Free Market 5.9% 1.8% 4.7%
Total 5.9% 1.8% 4.7%
ACEA
SMT 2.5% 1.4% N.A.
Free Market 0.9% 0.7% 1.3%
Total 3.4% 2.0% 1.3%
A2A
SMT 1.6% 0.7% N.A.
Free Market 1.3% 2.5% 4.0%
Total 3.0% 3.2% 4.0%
HERA
SMT 0.2% 0.1% N.A.
Free Market 2.2% 3.9% 5.1%
Safeguard N.A. 1.4% 1.5%
Total 2.4% 5.4% 6.6%
IREN
SMT 0.5% 0.3% N.A.
Free Market 1.7% 2.8% 3.0%
Total 2.3% 3.1% 3.0%
EDISON Free Market 2.0% 2.6% 6.0%Total 2.0% 2.6% 6.0%
DOLOMITI ENERGIA
SMT 0.4% 0.1% N.A.
Free Market 0.7% 2.0% 1.5%
Total 1.1% 2.1% 1.5%
E.ON Free Market 0.6% 2.3% 3.4%Total 0.6% 2.3% 3.4%
ALPERIA
SMT 0.2% 0.2% 3.0%
Free Market 0.3% 1.5% N.A.
Total 0.6% 1.7% 3.0%
Other Groups
SMT 1.40% 0.60% 0.00%
Free Market 7.60% 36.30% 45.90%
Safeguard 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total 9.10% 37.20% 46.00%
Source: 2018 Retail Market Monitoring Report (Autorità di Regolazione per Energia, Reti e Ambiente, 2019b).
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Table B.2. SMT vs free market share & switching rate (2008-2019). SMT and free market values are
expressed as thousand of active PODs. Switching rate is computed with respect to active PODs, net of
transitions to suppliers belonging the same corporate group.
Year SMT Free Market YoY growth % Free Market Δ Free Market % Switching
2008 27 155 870 n.a. 3.10% 3.10% 1.12%
2009 26 458 1 829 110% 6.47% 3.36% 2.29%
2010 25 424 3 240 77% 11.30% 4.84% 4.13%
2011 24 016 4 826 49% 16.73% 5.43% 5.77%
2012 23 173 5 798 20% 20.01% 3.28% 6.40%
2013 22 204 7 105 23% 24.24% 4.23% 7.41%
2014 21 203 8 425 19% 28.44% 4.19% 8.05%
2015 20 313 9 401 12% 31.64% 3.20% 8.02%
2016 19 619 10 278 9% 34.38% 2.74% 8.68%
2017 18 083 11 449 11% 38.77% 4.39% 7.88%
2018 16 660 12 821 12% 43.49% 4.72% 9.07%





Table C.1. Marginal effects of # of DSOs on Switching in OLS (4). Body-text regression in Col.(4), Tab. 3.2 p.33.
E.dist_share DSOs dy/dx Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval]
0 0.003047 0.000431 7.08 0 0.002146 0.003948
0.5 -0.0028 0.002556 -1.1 0.287 -0.00815 0.002549
0.6 -0.00397 0.003086 -1.29 0.214 -0.01043 0.00249
0.7 -0.00514 0.003618 -1.42 0.172 -0.01271 0.002434
0.8 -0.00631 0.004151 -1.52 0.145 -0.015 0.00238
0.9 -0.00748 0.004684 -1.6 0.127 -0.01728 0.002327
0.95 -0.00806 0.004951 -1.63 0.12 -0.01842 0.002301
Table C.2. Marginal effects of # of DSOs on Free_Market in OLS. Body-text regression in Tab. C.5 p.60.
E.dist_share DSOs dy/dx Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval]
0 -0.03003 0.014617 -2.05 0.054 -0.06062 0.000568
0.5 -0.01688 0.007149 -2.36 0.029 -0.03185 -0.00192
0.6 -0.01425 0.005755 -2.48 0.023 -0.0263 -0.00221
0.7 -0.01163 0.004468 -2.6 0.018 -0.02098 -0.00227
0.8 -0.009 0.003412 -2.64 0.016 -0.01614 -0.00186
0.9 -0.00637 0.002858 -2.23 0.038 -0.01235 -0.00039
0.95 -0.00505 0.002871 -1.76 0.094 -0.01106 0.000956
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Table C.3. Switching OLS regression (uncut version). Body-text regression in Tab. 3.2, p.33. Interaction’s
marginal effects in Tab. C.1, p.57.
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS
VARIABLES Switching Switching Switching Switching
DSOs -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Unemployment -0.048 -0.069* -0.001
(0.039) (0.035) (0.052)












































Constant -1.893*** -2.118*** -2.322*** -2.000***
(0.021) (0.228) (0.238) (0.132)
Observations 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.234 0.252 0.388 0.754
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.4. SUREG regression (uncut version). Body-text regression in Tab. 3.3, p.34.


























































Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.5. Free Market OLS regression. Interaction’s marginal effects in Tab. C.2, p.57.
OLS OLS OLS
Free_Market Free_Market Free_Market
VARIABLES coef stderr pval
Free_Market
DSOs -0.0300* 0.0146 0.0540
E.dist_share -0.00214* 0.00112 0.0711
DSOs*E.dist_share 0.0263 0.0156 0.107
Over65 -0.00148 0.00148 0.329
Net_income 2.398** 1.105 0.0429
Aosta Valley 0.00296 0.00215 0.184
Lombardy -0.0366** 0.0165 0.0385
Trentino-South Tyrol -0.0230** 0.00933 0.0232
Veneto -0.0336** 0.0147 0.0342
Friuli-Venezia Giulia -0.0232** 0.0103 0.0356
Liguria -0.00660** 0.00234 0.0108
Emilia-Romagna -0.0316** 0.0145 0.0422
Tuscany -0.0210** 0.00942 0.0379
Umbria -0.0147* 0.00730 0.0576
Marche -0.0168** 0.00715 0.0301
Lazio -0.0110** 0.00432 0.0196
Abruzzo 0.0255** 0.0119 0.0464
Molise 0.0286* 0.0138 0.0526
Campania 0.0516* 0.0253 0.0557
Apulia 0.0265* 0.0134 0.0617
Basilicata 0.0440* 0.0214 0.0542
Calabria 0.0439* 0.0217 0.0574
Sicily 0.0729** 0.0345 0.0482
Sardinia 0.0232* 0.0125 0.0792




Table C.6. Heteroscedasticity test.
Type of test Switching Free_market
Breutsch-Pagan
F(24, 82) = 1.08 1.45
Prob >F = 0.3858 0.1109
White
chi2(100) = 104.87 94.33
Prob >chi2 = 0.3498 0.2291
Table C.7. Collinearity test.
Collinearity Diagnostics
Variable SQRTVIF VIF Tolerance R-Squared Eigenval Condition Index
Switching 1.58 1.26 0.6326 0.3674 2.2824 1
DSOs 1.6 1.26 0.6249 0.3751 1.2111 1.3728
E.dist_share 1.97 1.4 0.5068 0.4932 0.6935 1.8141
Unemployment 1.28 1.13 0.7828 0.2172 0.4498 2.2527
Schooling 1.25 1.12 0.8002 0.1998 0.3633 2.5063
MEAN VIF 1.54 CONDITION # 2.5063
Variable SQRTVIF VIF Tolerance R-Squared Eigenval Condition Index
Free_market 1.35 1.16 0.7404 0.2596 1.9553 1
DSOs 1.46 1.21 0.684 0.316 1.4068 1.1789
E.dist_share 1.59 1.26 0.6289 0.3711 0.8017 1.5618
Over65 1.23 1.11 0.8129 0.1871 0.4272 2.1393
Net_income 1.62 1.27 0.6164 0.3836 0.409 2.1866
MEAN VIF 1.45 CONDITION # 2.1866
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